Drugs money costs

Why Ozempic Costs So Much More in the United States

A health-policy analysis of the international Ozempic price gap, the complex role of insurers and pharmacy benefit managers, and the political debate over who is responsible for the high cost of prescription drugs in the United States.

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Original Publisher

Editor’s Notes

I wrote this article for Health Compass in September 2024, following a U.S. Senate hearing that examined why American patients faced substantially higher list prices for Ozempic and Wegovy than patients in other countries.

Rather than treating the price as the result of a single company decision, the article examined the wider system behind prescription drug costs in the United States. This included international price differences, pharmacy benefit managers, manufacturer rebates, insurance coverage, deductibles, patent protection, government negotiation and the financial consequences for patients who lack comprehensive coverage.

This portfolio edition has been edited and restructured for clarity, balance and factual precision. It distinguishes more carefully between a drug’s published list price, the confidential net price received by the manufacturer and the amount an individual patient ultimately pays. It also reflects that the Inflation Reduction Act had already established a limited Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program when the original article was published, although the first negotiated prices were not scheduled to take effect until 2026. All figures, testimony and political arguments in this version refer primarily to information available around the original publication date.

Original Language

English

Originally published on

September 25, 2024

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Article

Contributors

The price of Ozempic in the United States has become one of the clearest examples of the country’s unusually expensive prescription drug market.

Ozempic, manufactured by Novo Nordisk, contains the active ingredient semaglutide and is primarily prescribed to adults with type 2 diabetes. Wegovy contains the same active ingredient at different approved dosages and is used for chronic weight management.

Both medicines have produced significant clinical results and rapidly growing demand. Their success, however, has also intensified a broader debate: Why do American patients and insurers face much higher prices than people purchasing the same medicines in other wealthy countries?

The answer involves more than manufacturing costs. It reflects a complex system of list prices, negotiated rebates, insurance rules, pharmacy benefit managers, patent exclusivity and limited price regulation.

At a U.S. Senate hearing held on September 24, 2024, lawmakers highlighted the dramatic difference between Ozempic’s American list price and prices reported in other countries.

At the time, the monthly U.S. list price was approximately $969. The Senate committee compared this with reported prices of:

  • $59 in Germany
  • $71 in France
  • $122 in Denmark
  • $155 in Canada

These comparisons attracted attention because the medicine was produced by the same company and based on the same active ingredient.

The figures appeared to present a simple story: Novo Nordisk was charging Americans far more because the United States allowed it to do so.

The reality was more complicated, but the price difference remained substantial.

Understanding the controversy requires distinguishing between three different prices.

The list price is the publicly stated price established by the manufacturer. It serves as a starting point for negotiations but does not necessarily represent the amount the manufacturer ultimately receives.

The net price is the amount remaining after rebates, discounts and fees negotiated with insurers and pharmacy benefit managers. These negotiations are generally confidential, making the true net cost difficult for patients and the public to evaluate.

The out-of-pocket price is the amount paid by the individual patient. This can vary dramatically depending on insurance coverage, deductibles, co-insurance, discount programs and eligibility for manufacturer assistance.

Novo Nordisk argued that focusing solely on the $969 list price created a misleading impression. The company stated that the net price it received for Ozempic had declined significantly since the product entered the U.S. market.

It also reported that most commercially insured patients with coverage for Ozempic or Wegovy paid considerably less than the published list price.

Those figures did not eliminate the affordability problem.

Patients without insurance, people whose insurance did not cover the medication and those enrolled in high-deductible plans could still be exposed to prices much closer to the full list amount.

Most comparable countries use centralized systems to assess the value of new medicines and negotiate or regulate the prices manufacturers can charge.

The United States has historically relied more heavily on negotiations between private companies. Manufacturers establish list prices, while insurers and other intermediaries negotiate discounts and rebates.

This fragmented structure gives different participants influence over the final cost:

  • Pharmaceutical manufacturers establish the initial list price.
  • Insurers decide which medications they will cover.
  • Pharmacy benefit managers negotiate rebates and manage formularies.
  • Employers select insurance plans for their workforces.
  • Pharmacies purchase and dispense the medication.
  • Patients pay amounts determined by their individual coverage.

Because negotiations frequently remain confidential, it can be difficult to determine how much each participant receives and whether negotiated savings reach patients at the pharmacy counter.

Pharmacy benefit managers, commonly known as PBMs, administer prescription drug benefits on behalf of health insurers, employers and government programs.

They negotiate with pharmaceutical companies and determine which drugs receive preferred placement on insurance formularies. In return for favorable access, manufacturers may provide rebates, discounts or other payments.

In principle, this negotiating power should reduce drug spending.

Critics argue that the rebate system can also create incentives that favor medications with high list prices. A larger list price can allow a manufacturer to offer a larger rebate while maintaining substantial revenue.

Patients do not always benefit directly from those rebates.

Someone paying co-insurance may owe a percentage of the medication’s list price rather than a percentage of the lower net price negotiated by the insurer. Patients who have not reached their annual deductible may also be required to pay a large portion of the medication’s cost themselves.

This means that a system producing significant discounts for insurers can still leave individual patients facing unaffordable bills.

During the Senate hearing, Novo Nordisk CEO Lars Fruergaard Jørgensen argued that the company did not ultimately receive the full list price charged for Ozempic.

According to his testimony, a large portion of the money associated with the company’s U.S. medicine sales returned to the healthcare system through rebates, discounts and fees.

He argued that PBMs and insurers expected significant rebates in exchange for favorable formulary placement. A unilateral reduction in the list price, he warned, could reduce those rebates and potentially cause insurers or PBMs to place a drug in a less favorable coverage position.

Jørgensen cited the experience of Levemir, a Novo Nordisk insulin product whose list price had been reduced. He said its insurance coverage subsequently declined substantially and presented this as evidence that lowering a list price does not automatically improve patient access.

The company’s central argument was therefore not that Ozempic was inexpensive. It was that the entire U.S. system had developed around rebates and negotiations, making a manufacturer-only solution difficult.

Senator Bernie Sanders and other members of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee challenged that explanation.

Sanders stated that three major PBMs had provided written assurances that lowering the list prices of Ozempic and Wegovy would not result in less favorable formulary placement, provided the drugs’ net prices remained equal or lower.

The PBMs reportedly argued that a lower list price could make the medicines more accessible rather than less accessible.

This created a direct disagreement between two powerful sides of the prescription drug market.

Novo Nordisk argued that PBM incentives made high list prices necessary to preserve access. The PBMs argued that the company could reduce its list prices without losing coverage.

For patients and policymakers, this disagreement demonstrated one of the system’s central problems: Each participant could point to another participant as the primary cause of high prices.

The amount paid for Ozempic varies widely.

A commercially insured patient whose plan covers the medication may pay a relatively small fixed co-payment. Manufacturer discount programs can further reduce the cost for some eligible patients.

Other patients face very different circumstances.

An uninsured patient may have no negotiated insurance rate. Someone with a high deductible may be required to pay most of the medication’s cost until reaching that deductible. A patient whose insurance excludes the medicine may need to pay the cash price or go without treatment.

Coverage can also depend on why the medication is prescribed.

Ozempic is approved for type 2 diabetes, while Wegovy is approved for chronic weight management. Insurance plans have generally been more likely to cover diabetes treatment than medication prescribed specifically for obesity.

The result is not one universal Ozempic price but a fragmented system in which access depends heavily on employment, insurance design, diagnosis and income.

For many years, federal law prevented Medicare from directly negotiating prices in the way national health systems in several other countries do.

That began to change with the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

The legislation created the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program, allowing the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to negotiate prices for a limited number of high-spending prescription drugs.

When the original Health Compass article was published in September 2024, the first negotiated prices had already been announced. Those prices were scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2026.

The program represented a significant policy shift, but it did not immediately transform the entire American prescription drug market. Only selected medicines were included, and the negotiated prices applied specifically within Medicare rather than across all private insurance markets.

The broader U.S. system therefore continued to differ significantly from countries that negotiate or regulate the prices of most new prescription medicines before they reach the market.

Ozempic is protected by patents and regulatory exclusivity that prevent immediate competition from generic versions of semaglutide.

This is not unique to the United States. Pharmaceutical patent protection exists internationally and is intended to reward companies for the cost and risk involved in developing new treatments.

The important difference is what happens while that exclusivity remains in place.

Countries with centralized price negotiations can limit the amount paid for a patented medication even when no generic competitor exists. In the United States, manufacturers have historically had greater freedom to establish high launch and list prices.

Competition from similar medications can create some market pressure. Eli Lilly’s tirzepatide products, for example, introduced an alternative within the rapidly expanding market for diabetes and weight-management medicines.

However, competition between patented brand-name drugs does not necessarily produce the same level of price reduction that typically follows the arrival of generics or biosimilars.

A reduction in Ozempic’s list price would most directly benefit patients whose costs are connected to that list price.

This could include:

  • Uninsured patients
  • Patients with high annual deductibles
  • Patients paying percentage-based co-insurance
  • People whose insurance does not cover the medication
  • Patients who are ineligible for manufacturer assistance

A lower list price could also reduce the financial exposure of employers, insurers and public healthcare programs.

However, the effect would depend on how every participant in the supply chain responded. A lower list price would not guarantee that insurers expanded coverage, that PBMs passed on all savings or that every pharmacy charged patients less.

Price reduction would therefore need to be accompanied by greater transparency and reforms addressing how rebates, formularies and patient cost-sharing are structured.

Pharmaceutical companies argue that high revenues help finance research, clinical trials, manufacturing expansion and the development of future medicines.

Developing a successful drug requires investment in many candidates that never receive regulatory approval. Strong intellectual property rights and the possibility of substantial financial returns are important incentives within the current pharmaceutical model.

Critics respond that affordability and innovation should not be treated as mutually exclusive.

They point to the enormous revenue generated by successful medications and question whether current prices primarily fund research or also support dividends, share repurchases, marketing and exceptionally high profit margins.

The relevant policy question is therefore not whether pharmaceutical companies should earn money from successful treatments.

It is how much revenue is necessary to preserve innovation while ensuring that patients can obtain the medicines those investments produce.

The Ozempic price controversy cannot be attributed entirely to one institution.

Novo Nordisk established the high American list price and benefited from the revenue generated in the U.S. market.

PBMs and insurers participated in a rebate-based system whose negotiations were largely hidden from patients.

Employers and insurance plans determined which medications received coverage and how costs were divided.

Federal policy historically limited direct government negotiation and allowed private market structures to shape prescription drug prices.

Each participant influenced the result, but no participant accepted sole responsibility for it.

The debate extends beyond a single medicine.

Ozempic and Wegovy represent a new generation of treatments that could be used by millions of people over long periods. Even when a medication produces major health benefits, an extremely high price can place pressure on patients, insurance premiums, employer health plans and public budgets.

A breakthrough medicine has limited public-health value when the people who need it cannot reliably access it.

The Ozempic price crisis revealed a deeper structural problem: The United States has created a prescription drug market in which the public list price, the manufacturer’s net revenue and the patient’s actual cost can be three very different numbers.

Until those relationships become more transparent, patients will continue to face a system that is difficult to understand and even harder to navigate.